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As the current wave of programs espousing corporate social
responsibility continues to grow, it seems as if almost every multinational
corporation in every industry has adopted some sort of program to address
this issue. A simple Google search for "corporate social responsibility"
results in over 16 million hits. While efforts to develop corporate social
responsibility continue at a frantic pace in many areas of corporate
policymaking, one area of particular interest is employment relations.
It should not be surprising that numerous corporate social
responsibility efforts are focused on the employment relationship. A
number of companies based in the United States have received widespread
negative attention for questionable employment practices. These practices
are frequently associated with the outsourcing of work to countries where
internationally recognized labor standards are not recognized. As publicity
concerning these cases spreads, some companies have responded by
developing corporate social responsibility programs known generically as
corporate codes of conduct. While much time and effort has been devoted
to these programs, few of them are successful. Needless to say, this should
not be surprising.
First, many corporate codes of conduct lack credibility. All but a few
of them are initiated, formulated, and finalized by administrators at the
highest levels of the enterprise, thereby omitting input from the very people
they are intended to benefit. Second, these codes frequently lack real
substance and fail to address vital elements that concern basic labor
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standards and essential procedures for implementation and enforcement.
Together, these inadequacies have resulted in widespread criticism.
Representatives of organized labor are especially critical of corporate
codes of conduct. In general, they view these codes as mere public
relations ploys that mislead conscious-laden consumers who would
otherwise boycott goods made or handled by exploited workers.
Furthermore, representatives of organized labor contend that corporate
codes of conduct also distract and confuse both workers and national policy
makers.'
In response to the growing use of codes, some representatives of
organized labor have begun to utilize what are known as International
Framework Agreements (IFAs). In theory, IFAs differ from unilaterally
implemented codes in at least two general ways: (1) they are a product of
negotiations between organized labor and the company, thereby including
the workers' perspective; and (2) they serve as an attempt to remedy the
content and procedural deficiencies associated with codes.
Six years ago, when this author examined voluntary corporate codes
of conduct, the development of IFAs was in its early stage. The author
noted that,
With respect to codes that are established in cooperation with
worker representatives, this article acknowledges that the number
of examples in this category is so exceedingly small-occurring
in only a handful of trade union instances-that it is difficult to
reach any conclusion about their merits. Further difficulties exist
given that these codes are, by and large, in their infancy and in
most cases not fully developed. Consequently, it is the conclusion
of this article that while they represent a positive step forward in
eliminating some of the more serious flaws of unilaterally
implemented codes, given their novelty, it is difficult to form any
significant conclusion about their merits.2
Since that article was published, roughly fifty IFAs have been
executed.' Since IFAs represent a new and growing form of corporate
social responsibility, it is necessary to reexamine them in their most current
context.4  This Article undertakes such a reexamination by addressing
1. See Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What is
Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 350 (2001) [hereinafter Voluntary Codes] (noting that
corporate codes of conduct are criticized for "distract[ing] and confus[ing]" consumers,
workers, and policymakers).
2. Id. at 351.
3. These IFAs have been signed by many companies and works councils, unions, and
Global Union Federations (GUFs). A list of them is attached in Table I. GUFs are
federations of unions that represent workers throughout the world. They are grouped by
specific industry, such as metalworkers and transport workers.
4. For the purposes of this Article, only IFAs from the GUF's IMF and BWI were
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whether IFAs can pave a path to corporate social responsibility. In order to
answer this question, two different but related topics are reviewed: (1) the
genesis of IFAs; and (2) IFAs in theory and in practice. The second topic
includes a detailed description of the essential elements that are crucial to
the success of an IFA.
II. IFAS: THE GENESIS
IFAs were developed by organized labor as a response to the growing
trend of corporate unilateral adoption of codes of conduct. Attacked by
labor organizations as empty gestures aimed at satisfying conscious-laden
consumers, IFAs were criticized for "dilut[ing] and divert[ing] the very
pressures for empowering workers and raising standards . . .,
The Building and Woodworkers' International (BWI or IFBWW) is
one of the Global Union Federations (GUFs) that pioneered the IFA. It
recognized that unilaterally implemented codes were often used for
"marketing purposes" and "were a response to negative publicity related to
exploitation and abusive labour practices in the production of famous brand
name goods.",6 Similarly, IG Metall, a giant metalworkers' union explained
that multinational companies started to adopt codes of conduct in response
to public attack "on account of their behaviour towards workers. . . ," As
with BWI, IG Metall criticized these codes as "serv[ing] primarily as PR or
marketing tools."'
The genesis of IFAs was not only a response to the failure of codes; it
was also the result of recognition that internationally recognized labor
standards had become generally accepted in the international arena. The
International Labor Organization's work on conventions and
recommendations, including its more recent Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, have served as a basis for this acceptance.
reviewed; see Table 2. These GUF's have been extremely active in negotiating IFAs in the
last few years acting as signatories in over half of all IFAs (the IMF has signed 16 and BWI
has signed 12) that have been negotiated. The ICEM and UNI are other GUFs that have
also been very active in negotiating IFAs.
5. Voluntary Codes, supra note I at 350, (citing Alan Howard, Why Unions Can 't
Support the Apparel Industry Sweatshop Code, WORKING USA, Jul/Aug. 1999 at 49).
6. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF BUILDING AND WOOD WORKERS, IFBWW
EXPERIENCES WITH GLOBAL COMPANY AGREEMENT, at 2 (Feb. 2004) available at
http://www.fitbb.org/index.cfm?l=2&n=l 1 [hereinafter IFBWW EXPERIENCES]. The
International Federation of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) is a GUF that represents
287 trade unions in the construction and wood working industries. Id. at 1. It became part
of the new GUF, Building and Woodworkers International (BWI), in 2005.
7. STEFAN ROB, SOCIAL MINIMUM STANDARDS IN MULTINATIONAL GROUPS:
ARGUMENTS AND PRACTICAL HELP TO INITIATE, NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT AN
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 5 (IG Metall, June 2004).
8. Id.
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The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the formation of
other international institutions that address these issues, lend further
support for broader acceptance of internationally recognized labor
standards.
Framework agreements were also developed in response to the
inadequacy of national laws in satisfying international labor standards.
This dissatisfaction spans from countries such as the United States and
Australia to Columbia, Burma, and China. Framework agreements served
as an attempt to compel companies to exceed their obligations under
national laws.
IFAs present a vehicle for determining a corporation's true
commitment to corporate social responsibility, while providing effective
means for achieving that commitment. Based on these distinguishing
factors, IFAs are, at least in theory, much different from corporate codes of
conduct. In contrast to corporate codes of conduct, which emanate from
unilateral decisions made by upper levels of management, IFAs are based
around the European model of social dialogue. According to the IFBWW,
IFAs "constitute a formal recognition of social partnership at the global
level" by providing "a global framework for protecting trade union rights
and encouraging social dialogue and collective bargaining."
9
The overall objective of an IFA that emanates from social dialogue is
to create corporate policies that are based on mutually agreed to principles
of corporate social responsibility. According to Amicus the Union, "if
done properly, [IFAs] offer a route for protecting and raising labor
standards in multinational companies."' IG Metall agrees, noting that
"[IFAs] are an instrument developed by the unions as a means of securing
fundamental workers' rights at all company's production sites around the
world."" Similarly, the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF)
explains that an IFA "is a global instrument with the purpose of ensuring
fundamental workers' rights .... ,, 2
Another common purpose of IFAs is to prevent corporations from
pitting workers in one country against workers in other countries. This
intention, as IG Metall explains, aims to
commit groups to observe minimum social standards during the
manufacture of their products, help to improve the living and
working conditions of workers and their families in the
9. IFBWW EXPERIENCES, supra note 6, at 3.
10. Amicus the Union, International Framework Agreements: An Amicus Position
Paper, at 3 (on file with author) (Amicus the Union is now known as Unite the Union).
11. ROB, supra note 7, at 5.
12. INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, THE POWER OF FRAMEwORK AGREEMENTS 3 (2003),
available at http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/ENG2.pdf (The IMF is a GUF that
represents workers in the metal industries).
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developing and newly industrialised countries. They place an
absolute minimum limit on attempts to gain a competitive
advantage by undercutting social standards and reduce the
pressure of unfair competition. 3
While representing a new tool for achieving corporate responsibility,
IFAs at this time are still almost exclusively limited to European companies
and are the products of European negotiations. Of the roughly fifty IFAs
that have been executed, only a small handful have been signed with non-
European-based companies.14  A frequent question posed by European
trade unionists is why IFAs are not being negotiated outside of Europe.
"The absence of IFAs with companies based outside of Europe has been
brought up repeatedly."' 5
The answer to this question has four different but related reasons.
First, European experience fosters a culture of dialogue. After all, the
move towards works councils, supervisory boards, co-determination, and
so forth is predicated on a basis of "dialogue" as opposed to one of an
adversarial nature. It seems only natural then, that discussion over new
mechanisms for achieving corporate social responsibility would emanate
from this type of industrial relations system. Second, in contrast, in the
United States there is no basis for social dialogue. Indeed, under the
structure of U.S. labor law, IFAs may not, in general, be considered to
constitute a mandatory subject for bargaining, and therefore, it is difficult
to "compel" a company to negotiate them. Third, in the United States,
many employers are openly hostile to unions; and, for the most part, the
legal institution of social dialogue does not exist. And fourth, U.S. workers
and their unions do not share certain protections enjoyed by many of their
European counterparts concerning health care, retirement security, job
security and benefits. These kinds of issues presumably take priority for
many U.S. workers, over IFAs, in discussions with an employer.
In view of the aforementioned, in order for an IFA to be relevant for
workers outside of Europe where social dialogue does not exist, like those
in the U.S., the IFA must serve as a standalone document. This is in sharp
contrast to much of Europe where understandings and discussions often
take place via social dialogue. These activities may serve to augment the
written IFA.
13. ROB, supra note 7, at 4.
14. See INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, ALL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS (June 14, 2006),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?n=47&l=2&c=10266 (listing all international
framework agreements concluded between Transnational Companies and Global Union
Federations).
15. INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, BACKGROUND TO INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
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If IFAs are to succeed where Codes have failed, they must be
available to workers anywhere in the world and they must be effective for
achieving the, so far illusive, corporate social responsibility. Their success
depends on their ability to address certain essential elements, which will
make them relevant to workers outside Europe (as well as inside Europe).
The next section of this paper reviews the importance of these elements and
explains what they include.
III. IFAs IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
In order for any IFA to be successful, it must satisfy four essential
elements. (Not coincidently, they are also the same elements that are
required to ensure the success of any Code.) First, coverage: IFAs must
cover the entire enterprise as well as all related entities of the enterprise.
Second, content: IFAs must, at a minimum, explicitly include International
Labor Organization (ILO) labor standards, referenced directly to the
appropriate Conventions. Third, implementation: IFAs must be effectively
implemented through communication and education; and fourth,
enforcement: IFAs must be enforced in a transparent, meaningful, and
effective manner.
A. IFAs Must Cover the Entire Enterprise As Well As All Related Entities
of the Enterprise.
International Framework Agreements must cover the entire enterprise,
including subsidiaries, suppliers, and joint ventures. This broad coverage is
essential for the success of any program. If an IFA is limited to a
company's direct employees, the lack of coverage for employees of its
suppliers will be a glaring omission and raise doubts about its commitment
to an IFA. It will also lead to the creation of two classes of workers in the
enterprise: one group that enjoys the benefits bestowed upon it by the IFA,
and another that does not.
The fact that companies are accelerating their use of outsourcing
heightens this concern. It is not difficult to imagine the skepticism of an
outsourced employee (as well as the general public) who is not covered by
an IFA, particularly when working alongside an employee of the company
who is covered by the IFA. Such a situation is untenable and its mere
possibility raises serious questions regarding the integrity of the IFA. It
raises the basic question, "how can a corporation claim to be socially
responsible if its IFA does not cover the entire enterprise?"
The importance of broad coverage for IFAs is reaffirmed by some
GUFs, who are actively pursuing IFAs, like the IMF. The guidelines of the
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IMF, which were developed several years ago, explain the importance for
such broad coverage:
Economic globalisation is lowering barriers to the movement of
goods, services and capital, and allowing transnational businesses
to create global production and distribution networks ....
... [T]he conditions under which its products or services are
made and that these responsibilities extend to all workers
producing products or services for [the] [company] whether or
not they are employees of [the] [company].
16
The IMF model provides detailed guidelines requiring:
[C]ontractors, their sub-contractors, principal suppliers, and
licensees (franchise holders) to provide the conditions and
observe the standards of the following agreement when
producing or distributing products or components of products for
[the] [company]. [Company] will, prior to placing orders with
principle suppliers, engaging contractors and subcontractors or
granting licensees, assess whether the provisions of this
Agreement will be met."
The IMF agreement also carefully defines the meaning of
"subcontractor" as well as what constitutes a "supplier, a licensee and a
franchise holder."' 8 Other GUFs also stress the importance of covering
subcontractors. 19
Obtaining agreement for broad coverage in IFAs is not easy since
many companies reject demands for broad coverage arguing that they
cannot be held accountable for the treatment of employees over which they
have no control. Current IFAs generally fall into one of three categories
regarding second and third party coverage: (1) coverage is objectively
clear; (2) coverage is ambiguous, often limited to non-mandatory phrases
like "encourage," "support," or "urge"; or (3) provisions regarding
coverage are lacking in their entirety.




18. See id. at 1-2 (defining commonly used terms for purposes of the IMF Model
International Framework Agreement).
19. See, e.g., INT'L FED'N OF BUILDING AND WOOD WORKERS, IFBWW MODEL
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, http://www.ifbww.org/index.cfm?n=191&l=2&on=7 (last visited
Dec. 2, 2007) (referring to subcontractors' obligations in two separate provisions). On
November 16, 2007, BWI (successor to the IFBWW) adopted a "New BWI Model
Framework agreement". Since the new model agreement was adopted shortly before
publication, it did not serve as a basis for review for this Article.
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While, as mentioned, the IMF guidelines contemplate broad core
coverage, very few of its IFAs clearly cover suppliers or other contractors.
Of the IMF's sixteen, IFAs, only two have relatively strong language
regarding suppliers. One of them, PSA Peugeot Citroen, represents
perhaps the strongest language in any IFA regarding suppliers.2 ° In that
IFA, suppliers are "require[d]" to "make similar commitments with regard
to their respective suppliers and subcontractors."2' The Peugeot IFA also
states that:
When requesting quotes from suppliers, PSA Peugeot Citroen
agrees to assure that compliance with human rights . . . is a
determining factor in the selection of suppliers for the panel ....
Any failure to comply with human rights requirements will result
in a warning from PSA PEUGOT CITROEN and a plan of
corrective measures must be drawn up. Non-compliance with
these requirements will result in sanctions including withdrawal
from the supplier panel.22
The majority of the IMF's IFAs include supplier provisions that are
either merely "suggestive" or simply ambiguous. The European
Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) IFA is typical of the
more suggestive approach. It states that EADS "expects all its suppliers to
recognise and apply the principles of this framework agreement and
encourages them to introduce and implement principles in their own
companies. 23
Several of the IMF's other IFAs reflect even weaker provisions with
respect to suppliers. The Rheinmetall IFA is typical of these approaches:
"Rheinmetall AG supports and expressly encourages its business partners
to take into account and apply the agreed guidelines in their own corporate
policy.,
24
Some of the IMF's IFAs address suppliers, but the provisions are so
vague that it is difficult to determine what is the intent of the language. For
example, Volkswagen's IFA links coverage to reflect its own "corporate
20. PSA PEUGEOT CITROEN, PSA PEUGEOT CITROEN GLOBAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 8 (2006),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/06041112011079/ifa psa-english2006.pdf (expressing
PSA Peugeot Citroen's commitment to promotion of fundamental human rights).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. EUROPEAN AERONAUTIC DEFENSE AND SPACE CO., INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT 5 (2005),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/05071112175266/IFA EADSeng.pdf. It also states
that, "compliance with EADS standards serves as a criterion for selecting suppliers," raising
the question, what exactly does "expects" mean?
24. RHEINMETALL AG, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINES AT RHEINMETALL AG (CODE
OF CONDUCT) 5 (2003), http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/ifa-rheimnetall-english.pdf.
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policy."25 Some, including Arcelor, BMW, and Prym, merely encourage
their "contractors and suppliers" to "take the agreement into consideration
in their own company [policies]." 2 6  Merloni, on the other hand, only
addresses "direct suppliers", and even then, omits explicit reference to ILO
Conventions 87 and 98 (concerning freedom of association and collective
bargaining)in its IFA.
2 7
To complicate matters, some of the IMF's IFAs apply different
language concerning supplier obligations, depending on which labor
standard is being referenced.2 8 For example, Renault's IFA may qualify the
coverage for suppliers depending on which internationally recognized labor
standard is involved. While the agreement mandates that suppliers and
service providers comply with Renault's policies regarding child labor and
forced labor, it does not specifically reference compliance for suppliers and
service providers with respect to ILO standards regarding equal
opportunities, salaries and wages, and employee representation.29
Other GUFs that also contain strong language in their model
agreements fare much better than the IMF in obtaining broad coverage in
their IFAs. Of the ten or so IFAs signed by the IFBWW, eight explicitly
cover some form of suppliers.3a For example, BWI's IFA with Hochtief
requires contractual partners to ensure that their subcontractors adhere to its
code of conduct."' Similarly, BWI's IFA with Impregilo S.p.A. notes that
25. VOLKSWAGEN, DECLARATION ON SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS AT
VOLKSWAGEN 1 (2002), http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/Sozialcharta-eng3l.pdf
(declaring that fundamental social rights and principles are the basis of Volkswagen's
Corporate Policy).
26. ARCELOR, WORLDWIDE AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ARCELOR'S CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2005),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/0510111500347/IFAFINALEN.pdf. BMW, JOINT
DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE BMW GROUP 3 (2005),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/0505101759457/bmw-ifa-english.pdf ("The BMW
Group expects its business partners and suppliers to use these principles as a basis in their
mutual dealings ...."); PRYM, DECLARATION ON THE SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS WITHIN THE PRYM GROUP 3 (July 7, 2004),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/prym-ifa-eng.pdf ("Prym supports and encourages its
business partners, to consider this declaration in its own respective company policy.").
27. MERLONI, STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT (Dec. 2001),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/Files/0 1-1 77.pdf (stating the implementation and compliance
standards of Merloni with the ILO Convention).
28. Of course, some of this language could also be lost in translation.
29. RENAULT, RENAULT GROUP EMPLOYEES' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DECLARATION
(Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/ifa-renaulten.pdf (presenting
fundamental principles of social responsibility that Renault believes are key to their long-
term success).
30. See infra Table 2.
31. HOCHTIEF, HOCHTIEF CODE OF CONDUCT (Mar. 15, 2000),
http://www.ifbww.org/index.cfm?n=194&l=2&on=7 (requiring contractual partners to
follow the conditions and standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in
2007]
196 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
it will only work with contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers that
respect workers' rights.
32
B. IFAs Must at a Minimum Explicitly Include Internationally
Recognized Labor Standards Such As Those Reflected in ILO
Conventions.
To be effective, an IFA must specifically incorporate explicit and
comprehensive ILO standards that are embodied in its conventions,
recommendations, and interpretive documents. These standards have been
discussed frequently and are largely reflected by the ILO's Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.33 They are also reflected by
the multinational guidelines on enterprises as adopted by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).34
Many corporations are familiar with these standards. Several years
ago, representatives from government, business, labor, academia, and non-
governmental organizations from the United States and Europe met at the
Symposium on Codes of Conduct and International Labor Standards.35
While there was much disagreement on many of the topics covered during
the two days of discussions, the attendees all acknowledged that core labor
standards should be "a starting point and a bare minimum.
3 6
Most IFAs incorporate at least some reference to the basic core labor
standards and principles, including those that concern: prohibitions on
forced labor, equal pay, prohibitions on discrimination, prohibitions on
respect to the rights of HOCHTIEF employees).
32. IMPREGILO S.p.A, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN IMPREGILO S.p.A. AND
IFBWW (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.ifbww.org/index.cfin?n=219& I =2&on=7 (stating that
Impregilo "considers the respect for workers [sic] rights to be a crucial element in
sustainable development and will therefore engage only those contractors, subcontractors
and suppliers which recognise and respect the criteria..." set forth in the agreement).
33. INT'L LABOUR ORG., ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
AT WORK, 86th Sess. (June 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static-jump?var language=EN&var
_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT (stating that members must uphold fundamental rights,
including the freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the elimination of
compulsory labor, child labor, and employment discrimination).
34. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
(noting that members must "contribute to the effective abolition of child labor," "contribute
to the elimination of all forms of compulsory labor," and abide by nondiscriminatory
principals).
35. The first symposium was held in Brussels in February 1998, the second in
Washington, D.C., in December 1998.
36. Voluntary Codes, supra note 1, at 352 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, JOINT REPORT
ON THE MAIN ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE US-EU SYMPOSIUM ON CODES OF CONDUCT AND
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 5 (Sept. 1999)).
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child labor, health, safety, lifelong learning, and the freedom of association
and collective bargaining.37 Some IFAs also include provisions concerning
health and safety, decent pay, work-time, and maintaining a positive
attitude toward unions.38
While most IFAs include at least some references to these principles,
not all of them explicitly incorporate ILO Conventions and
Recommendations.39 Even fewer of them elaborate on the actual meaning
of these standards.40 Without a clear understanding of these fundamental
human rights, IFA signatories could be on the road to serious
misunderstandings when disputes under the IFAs arise. Indeed, some
companies that sign IFAs will interpret them in the most minimum sense,
often believing that IFA requirements are limited to national laws.
For most Global Union Federations and labor organizations, however,
IFAs represent commitments that exceed standards set by national laws.
For example Amicus the Union emphasizes:
[I]t is not enough to just include statements of principle in an IFA
on core issues such as freedom of association, protection against
child labour etc. Where standards outlined within the IFA have
been taken from internationally recognised bodies (ILO, OECD,
etc.) a clear reference must be made back to the original
declaration/charter/treaty to allow for an effective assessment of
the application of this principle against concrete, internationally
recognised standards. The clearest example of this is in reference
to the core labour standards as determined by the ILO. It is
important that the actual ILO Convention numbers are included
in the text of the IFA to ensure the accurate definition and
application of these standards. 41
This is a fundamental issue that distinguishes IFAs from Codes of
Conduct and, for labor groups, goes to the core of an IFA's credibility. It
makes little sense from a labor group's perspective to negotiate an
agreement with a company that sets forth standards that it is already
required to honor through national law. Such an IFA would be tantamount
to negotiating an agreement that obligates a corporation to obey already-
existing laws.
37. See, e.g., INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, supra note 16, at 2-3; INT'L FED'N OF
BUILDING AND WOOD WORKERS, supra note 19, at 2; Merloni, Statement of Agreement,
supra note 17, ("[The Compnay] shall: be oriented toward promoting 'positive action' to
support the principles of trade union freedom, organization of workers and collective
bargaining."); see also infra Table 2.
38. See, e.g., PSA PEUGEOT CITROEN, supra note 20; see also infra Table 2.
39. See infra Table 2.
40. Id.
41. Amicus the Union, supra note 10, at 6.
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In countries such as China, where ILO standards are not recognized,
an IFA's applicability regarding principles of freedom of association and
rights to collective bargaining goes to the very heart of its success. After
all, how can a corporation claim that it is honoring international labor
standards when its IFA cannot be applied to one of the world's largest and
fastest growing economies?
In other countries, such as the United States, where questions of
freedom of association arise with respect to anti-union activities of
companies, activities that may not violate U.S. Labor Law could arguably
violate international labor standards.42 Likewise, the correct interpretation
of these labor standards covered by the IFA has profound implications as
well.
In the United States an employer's conduct may arguably be lawful
under U.S. law, but be in violation of international labor standards as
reflected by ILO conventions and accompanying jurisprudence. 43  This
raises a serious question: Are the standards covered by an IFA limited to
national law, or do they exceed national law when international labor
standards provide for greater protections? This fundamental question
should be addressed in the IFA and a clear understanding should be
reached prior to its execution. Without the resolution of matters
concerning the breadth of national and international laws, it is almost
inevitable that fundamental misunderstandings and conflicts will occur.
The critical nature of this point is exemplified by one IFA case that
arose out of an organizing campaign in the United States.44 The organizing
drive was conducted by a North American union at a facility of a
European-based company in the southern part of the United States. Prior to
the commencement of this activity, the parent company entered into an IFA
with one of the GUFs and its works council. The IFA covered subsidiaries
of the company and the particular facility that was the subject of the
organizing drive. In other words, the IFA clearly covered the right to
organize and freedom of association.
Several weeks after the IFA was executed, the organizing campaign
was underway. During the campaign, the subsidiary engaged in an anti-
42. See Press Release, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Files International Complaint on
Bush Labor Board's Sweeping Anti-Worker Decisions (October 25, 2007),
available at http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr10252007.cfm
(anouncing the filing of a complaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association by the AFLC-CIO concerning the United States government's
violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining by failing to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act).
43. Id.
44. At the time of publication of this Article, this matter is still pending. As a
consequence, the author wishes not to identify the name of the company involved.
Documents pertaining to the case are on file with the author.
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union campaign, complete with attacks on unions in general and the union
that was engaged in organizing activities at its facility, specifically.
The union, which was aware of the IFA, quickly notified the Works
Council about the company's conduct. The chair of the Works Council
condemned the company's activities stating that, "In the opinion of both
chairmen of the European Works Council (EWC), this action is a blatant
breach of the content of our IFA".
The company responded to the complaint almost one month later. In
its response it did not dispute "the facts stated in [the] letter. 46 Rather, it
noted that "the local executive management . . . underlines that they are
compliant with legislation and with American practice. 47  The letter
further noted:
[T]hus, the reaction of the local executive management . . .
however surprising that might seem in Europe, is in line with the
law and with American practices .... This obviously must cause
us to think about the interpretation and conditions under which
we apply the terms of our International Framework Agreement in
countries where the social environment can differ greatly from
that which we have in Europe .... The [company] adheres to the
principles and values stipulated by the International Framework
Agreement. It believes.., that such application must be carried
out while observing legal regulations, practices, and cultures
within the countries welcoming our presence.48
The company's response raises several concerns about the IFA. The
ability of the company to wage an anti-union campaign even for a short
amount of time could have effectively killed the organizing campaign. It
also raises serious questions for the future of the IFA. Does this mean that
the company interprets its IFA as being limited to national law, while the
worker representatives, who also serve as signatories, interpret the IFA as
exceeding national laws when those laws do not reflect international
standards?
49
45. Letter from the Chairman of the European Works Council to the Company, (Oct.
24, 2005) (Company and Works Council not identified due to active status of complaint, see
supra note 44) (on file with author).
46. Letter from the Company to the Chairman of the European Works Council, (Nov.
11, 2005). (Company and Works Council not identified due to active status of complaint,
see supra note 44) (on file with author).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. For example, United States law permits the use of permanent striker replacements.
However, the use of permanent striker replacements is arguably a violation of international
labor standards. In response to a 1990 Complaint, filed by the AFL-CIO before the ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association, that the use of permanent striker replacements had
an impact on workers' freedom to exercise internationally recognized rights under
international labor conventions, specifically the rights concerning the freedom of association
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IFA models, like those issued by the IMF and BWI, specifically
include ILO standards. They also elaborate on issues like freedom of
association, referring to concepts like "neutrality" and requiring that
companies adopt "positive" attitudes towards unions.5 °
Of the IMF's IFAs examined, all but one, SKF, referenced ILO
standards in at least some fashion.5' One of them, DaimlerChrysler, went
beyond mere references to ILO standards.52 The DaimlerChrysler IFA
contains a "neutrality" provision, but fails to provide any definition of
"neutrality" or what company conduct is in accordance with "neutrality."53
All ten of BWI's IFAs had specific language regarding ILO standards,
but only two of them went beyond mere reference to those standards. The
Impregilo IFA stated that the company:
shall adopt a positive view of the activities of trade unions and an
open attitude to their organi[z]ing activities. Impreglio S.p.A.
therefore undertakes not to oppose efforts to unionize its
employees and guarantees that workers representatives shall not
be discriminated against and shall have access to all workplaces
necessary to enable them to carry out their representative
functions.54
While some may argue that IFAs cannot be customized to address
labor relations in every country, failure to elaborate on labor standards and
anticipate disputes jeopardizes the goal of IFAs-to improve workers'
rights throughout the world. After all, if an IFA offers no meaningful
coverage to workers in countries like China, where national law falls below
and the rights to collective bargaining, the committee concluded:
The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and their
organisations may promote and defend their economic and social interests. The
Committee considers that this basic right is not really guaranteed when a worker
who exercises it legally runs the risk of seeing his or her job taken up
permanently by another worker, just as legally. The Committee considers that,
if a strike is otherwise legal, the use of labour drawn from outside the
undertaking to replace strikers for an indeterminate period entails a risk of
derogation from the right to strike which may affect the free exercise of trade
union rights.
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO), REP.
No. 278, CASE No. 1543, para. 92, (1991), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/single.pl?query=0319912781543@ref&chspec=03.
50. INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, supra note 16, at 2; INT'L FED'N OF BUILDING AND
WOOD WORKERS, supra note 19, at 2.
51. See infra Table 2.
52. DAIMLER, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLES OF DAIMLER CHRYSLER 2 (2002),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/DC%20code%20in%2OEnglish.pdf.
53. Id.
54. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN IMPREGILO S.P.A AND IFBWW 2 (2004),
http://www.ifbww.org/files/ACC-Impregilo-engl.pdf.
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international labor standards, or even the United States and other countries,
where questions of international labor standards are raised, then the
credibility and reliability of an IFA is threatened.
C. IFAs Must Be Effectively Implemented.
In order for an IFA to be effective, it must be implemented.
Implementation involves two separate but related activities:
communication and education.
With respect to communication, IFAs must be coherently written and
translated for all levels of employees at an enterprise and its suppliers.
This means that it must be written in easy-to-understand terms, translated
into a variety of languages, and distributed throughout the world. Careful
attention must be paid to the translation. Even slight variances in wording
can lead to radical differences in meaning. Of course, dissemination of an
IFA must also be accomplished immediately after an IFA is executed, if not
before. Far too often, IFAs have been "released" but the actual workers
who are to benefit from the IFAs are not aware of them for several weeks
or even months after they are executed, if ever.5
Communication by itself, however, is not enough. Education is an
essential component of the implementation process. After all, concepts
such as freedom of association and collective bargaining are highly
complex. Many employees and their managers will probably have had
little exposure to these principles, let alone any real understanding of them.
In order for an IFA to be at all effective, employees and managers, at all
levels of an enterprise, must have a working understanding of the substance
and procedures contained in the IFA. This education must be completed in
a timely basis.
Few models or guidelines, such as those of the IMF or BWI, come
close to adequately addressing this element.5 6  While the term
"distribution" of an IFA is referenced, no procedures are specified.
About half of the IFAs reviewed address "implementation," but limit
the provision to "distribution" in the various languages. For example, the
BMW IFA states that, "contents of this joint declaration shall be
disseminated with the BMW Group and in an appropriate manner."57
Others state that it will be distributed through "proper channels,"
55. During a Conference on IFAs, hosted by the International Metalworkers' Federation
in Frankfurt, Germany in November 2006, situations were discussed in which workers were
not aware of IFAs for significant periods of time after they were executed. The author
participated in this conference.
56. INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, supra note 16; INT'L FED'N OF BUILDING AND WOOD
WORKERS, supra note 19.
57. JOINT DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE BMW
GROUP 3 (2005), http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/0505101759457/bmw-ifa-english.pdf.
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"appropriate forms in accordance with local practice," or made in a
"suitable manner."5 8  Few IFAs include language requiring IFAs to be
circulated to suppliers and suppliers' employees. None of the IFAs
reviewed specified any sort of comprehensive training program concerning
the education of all personnel throughout the company on basic concepts
like freedom of association and collective bargaining.
If an IFA's contents and procedures are not understood by both
management and workers, its effectiveness will be in serious doubt. Stated
another way, if no one receives the IFA, no one will know of its existence
and it will do little good. Even if workers receive an IFA in a timely
fashion and in an accessible format, it will be of little value to any workers
if no one understands-actually understands-what the labor standards
mean. The reality is, concepts like freedom of association-the
fundamental right to form one's own union or to engage in collective
bargaining-are not simple concepts. They are not simple for workers who
live in places like the U.S. or Europe where collective bargaining is
acknowledged in the law, let alone in countries like China, where
exercising freedom of association can result in dramatic repercussions.59
D. IFAs Must Be Effectively Enforced.
Even if IFAs have proper coverage, content, and implementation, they
are essentially ineffective and meaningless if enforcement is inadequately
addressed. It is obvious that it does little good for employees to assert
obligations under an IFA only to be left with a unilateral decision by the
company refusing to honor its commitments. Indeed, if enforcement is not
timely or does not represent a deterrent for socially irresponsible behavior,
as defined by an adequate IFA, it will be useless for the workers it is
intended to benefit. Likewise, if no adequate remedy exists or if the
resolution is left in the hands of the employer, the perpetrator of the
violation of the IFA, then workers will quickly see the futility of asserting
any rights under the IFA and will see their rights and benefits as being
hollow.
For enforcement to be effective, there must be a monitoring system
which randomly inspects facilities. Monitoring is necessary for ensuring
the integrity of the program. Enforcement must also provide adequate and
timely remedies to employees asserting claims under an IFA. Of course,
58. See infra Table 2.
59. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (ITUC), 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS: CHINA (2007), http://survey07.ituc-
csi.org/getcountry.php?IDCountry=CHN&IDLang=EN; Section 301 Petition of the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Before the Office
of the United States Trade Representative, at 55-68 (June 8, 2006).
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all aspects of these activities must be transparent and accessible to workers
covered by an IFA.
Effective monitoring enables experts who are well versed in the
application of internationally recognized labor standards to determine if the
IFA is being honored.
Monitoring systems can be internal and/or external to the company.
Internal monitoring consists of personnel from the company appointed to
60form a monitoring group. In order for this type of monitoring to have any
integrity, the group must be familiar with international labor standards and
their applications. Internal monitoring groups must also have equal
participation from legitimate worker participants, such as union or works
council representatives. The groups must also have adequate access to the
inner workings of the companies they are monitoring and must be allowed
to conduct random site visits. Among other things, internal monitors must
have independence.
External monitoring is accomplished by utilizing outside experts who
perform many of the same functions of an internal group. Unfortunately,
some companies use outside "auditors" for such monitoring purposes. Like
internal auditors, external monitors must be truly independent and must
have working knowledge of the labor concepts reflected by international
labor standards. The use of auditors who have little or no understanding of
international labor standards does little to advance efforts at meaningful
corporate social responsibility. It does even less to advance a program's
integrity.6
Only a handful of the IMF's and BWI's framework agreements
contain references to monitoring. Almost all of these IFAs reference
monitoring only in a general way.62
Moreover, it appears that some of them only contemplate annual
oversight and not the type of monitoring that involves inspections of the
company's facilities and/or suppliers. Those IFAs that do make note of an
inspection system are usually limited to internal monitoring. Only one
60. See Herrnstadt, supra note 1, at 361 ("Internal monitoring is most common and, by
its very nature, raises serious questions regarding its legitimacy. After all, internal monitors
often have very strong ties to the company itself ... questions remain regarding internal
monitor's expertise in terms of understanding and applying internationally recognized labor
standards.") (noting, Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through
Private Initiatives, 30 L. POL'Y & INT'L BUS. 111, 119 (1998)).
61. See id. (arguing that auditors are generally not useful because either they have a
previous business relationship with the corporation that they are monitoring or they lack the
requisite knowledge of labor laws and therefore resort to using formulaic questionnaires).
62. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN SCHWANHAUBER
INDUSTRIE HOLDING GMBH & Co KG (STABILO) AND IG METAL 2 (2005) ("A monitoring
Committee will monitor the implementation of this agreement .... The committee will
meet once a year and will conduct monitoring every two years...").
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IFA, IKEA's, refers to the possibility of using outside groups for
monitoring:
The IKEA Trading Service office has the direct responsibility to
support and monitor the suppliers. To ensure compliance with
the requirements, IKEA has also formed a global compliance and
monitoring group in order to support and follow-up
developments on a global basis. IKEA always reserves the right
to check suppliers with the help of independent organisations.63
While monitoring assists signatories in determining when and where
violations of an IFA occur, other enforcement mechanisms are needed to
provide effective and timely remedies for violations. 4  Remedies could
come in several different forms: monetary damages based on pre-set
agreements, back pay and benefits, formal admissions, posting of notices,
discontinuation of subcontracts, or withdrawal from the IFA, to name a
few.65 Regardless, determinations regarding remedies must be made under
well-defined procedures, incorporating a dispute resolution mechanism
such as binding arbitration which ensures above all, the reliability,
predictability, and integrity of the program.
Enforcement might even take place through more informal programs
that are not addressed by the IFA, including worker solidarity actions or
public campaigns waged by those seeking an end to the IFA violation. It
could also include withdrawal from the IFA by signatories who represent
worker organizations.
The IFA model agreements of the IMF and BWI largely ignore
language concerning most elements of enforcement. The lack of
recognition of this crucial element by these GUFs is painfully apparent in
almost all of their IFAs.
Indeed, few IFAs address enforcement in any significant fashion. For
example, the Bosch IFA only says that complaints will be brought to the
attention of the "Executive Committee of the Europa Committee.,
66
Others, such as the DaimlerChrysler IFA, only refer to reports and
63. The IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing Products, in BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS 385 (Radu Mares ed., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 2004), available at http://www.bwint.org/pdfs/iwayma.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,
2007).
64. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association notes that enforcement is essential
for the implementation of these Conventions. There is a "need to provide expeditious...
and wholly impartial means of redressing grievances .. " HECTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA
CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
SYSTEM & BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 216-17 (1996).
65. Remedies for violating the ILO Conventions could include compensation as well as
penalties, according to the ILO Committee of Experts. Id. at 218.
66. BOSCH, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AT BOSCH 3 (2004),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/Files/ifa-bosch-en.pdf.
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consultations with corporate management.67 Only the EADS IFA mentions
the acceptance of some form of a dispute resolution mechanism: "In a
situation of conflict, the arbitration process will be mutually agreed by the
EADS head of Human Resources and the European Works Council. 68
The Bosch IFA serves as a good example of how an IFA may become
ineffective if it does not include an adequate enforcement mechanism. 69 In
November 2005, employees at the Bosch/Doboy facility in Richmond,
Wisconsin went on strike.7°
The IAM, the North American union which represented the Bosch
workers, sent a letter to the IMF asking if the company's conduct
concerning a variety of issues constituted a violation of the IFA.71 (The
IMF is a signatory to the Bosch IFA.) The IMF responded in the
affirmative, and later stated that it was "demanding that German Bosch
management responsible for implementing the IFA recognise that such an
action is not in accordance with the IFA and prevent their US [sic]
management from breaching it in this way."7" The IMF's efforts did not
resolve the situation.73 Since there is no enforcement in the Bosch IFA
mechanism, or for that matter, a neutral dispute resolution mechanism in
the IFA, the dispute had nowhere to go after the matter was raised with the
company. Now, bitter workers in Wisconsin have little confidence in the
IFA, let alone the IMF and the Works Council that serve as the IFA's
signatories.
Success stories about the effectiveness of IFAs are scant. The IMF
touts one success involving a supplier in Turkey to DaimlerChrysler, Ditas:
67. DAIMLERCHRYSLER, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLES OF DAIMLERCHRYSLER 4
(2002), http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/DC%20code%20in%2OEnglish.pdf.
68. EUROPEAN AERONAUTIC DEFENSE AND SPACE COMPANY, INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 6 (2005),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/05071112175266/IFAEADS-eng.pdf.
69. See INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, BACKGROUND TO INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENTS IN THE IMF 13 (2006),
www.imfmetal.org/main/files/06081513541679/Backgrounddocument-english-final.pdf
("At the Bosch World Conference held in Germany in 2006, a number of complaints were
raised about company actions, some of which breach the IFA provisions on freedom of
association and the right to collectively bargain, discrimination and the right to equal pay.").
70. Id.
71. Letter from R. Thomas Buffenbarger, IAM President, to Marcello Malentacchi,
IMF General Secretary, (Nov. 22, 2005) (on file with author) (concentrating on disputed
issues other than permanent replacement workers as this letter was written prior to the
matter concerning replacements).
72. INT'L METALWORKERS' FED'N, BACKGROUND TO INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENTS IN THE IMF 13 (2006),
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/files/06081513541679/Background-document-english-
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In 2002, Ditas workers took industrial action because of the
employer's refusal to respect trade union rights at the workplace
and to bargain with the union, thus breaching ILO Conventions
87 on freedom of association and 98 on the right to organise and
bargain collectively as well as the DaimlerChyrsler IFA covering
suppliers. A letter from the WEC to management about the
breach played a significant role in a negotiated settlement being
reached.
7 4
While an IFA may have had "a significant role" in the success at
Ditas, this matter may have more to do with the social dialogue that existed
between the company and its Works Council than the IFA. Regardless,
finding successes of IFAs are rare, as noted by the IMF: "Outside of
DaimlerChrysler, few clear examples are available of breaches of an IFA
being raised and resolved, either in the company itself or its suppliers. 75
IFAs present entities representing workers with a unique mechanism
to improve their lives through meaningful and effective corporate social
responsibility. Negotiating IFAs, however, does carry certain risks. These
risks are greater if all of the essential elements outlined previously are not
adequately incorporated into the IFA. Indeed, for organizations that
represent workers, an inadequate IFA may have many adverse results. By
entering into an IFA, a worker organization puts its own credibility on the
line. Failure to negotiate an effective IFA may raise questions regarding
the worker organization's competence; questions that can cripple that
organization in an organizing drive or in heated collective bargaining
negotiations. Entering into an IFA may also raise an appearance of
complicity with the very corporations who also serve as a signatory to an
inadequate IFA. While it may be easy to blame a company for a failed
code of conduct, a negotiated IFA that fails can just as easily be blamed on
the worker organization that serves as a signatory to the agreement. This is
compounded by modem communications, which allow the success or
failure of an IFA to be learned by millions of people.
Another implication of a failed IFA is that it will sour any effort for
future IFAs. After all, workers that think they will benefit from an IFA, but
ultimately do not, will understandably be skeptical about any future IFA
efforts.
In some cases, the negative effects of a failed IFA could have an even
more profound impact on workers because they might actually be worse off
with an inadequate IFA than without one. Some workers might undertake
activities they believe are protected under the IFA only to learn that the
IFA is powerless to protect them. Even if workers are not directly hurt by




corporation with a public relations benefit that is not deserved. An
inadequate IFA could also remove pressure on the corporation to honor
international standards in the mistaken belief that the company is in
compliance with the standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The wave of programs advocating corporate social responsibility
continues. As discussed in this Article, when it comes to the workplace,
these programs often take the form of corporate codes of conduct. These
codes, however, have been met with well-founded skepticism. They are
frequently drafted and implemented solely by the corporation with little or
no input from its workers. They often have limited coverage, excluding
suppliers and contractors that are integral to the company. Additionally,
standards reflected in codes are frequently weak. Few efforts at
implementation have been made and provisions for meaningful
enforcement have been omitted. In short, serious questions have been
raised concerning the ability of corporate codes to achieve corporate social
responsibility.
IFAs represent organized labor's response to corporate codes of
conduct. This Article has examined the elements that are required to
distinguish IFAs from codes. As mentioned, they shouldbe negotiated, not
unilaterally drafted, include the entire enterprise (e.g., suppliers and
subcontractors), be based on internationally recognized labor standards, be
implemented with adequate attention to communication and education and
be enforced utilizing effective mechanisms for monitoring and resolving
disputes.
This Article has also examined several IFAs. Since the IMF and BWI
are two of the most active GUFs today with respect to IFAs, this review has
focused on their IFAs. 7 6 Unfortunately, the article has found that none of
the IFAs reviewed adequately address each of the foregoing essential
elements. This raises serious concerns over the ability of current IFAs to
succeed where corporate codes have failed.
Certainly, current IFAs are in much need of improvement. That said,
IFAs do represent a bilateral attempt to achieve corporate social
responsibility. And that, by itself, is a positive step. If the parties to these
agreements are sincere about achieving corporate social responsibility, if
they have the will to improve current agreements and if they adequately
address the aforementioned essential elements, then there is hope that IFAs
may lead to genuine corporate social responsibility in the not too distant
future. Are IFAs a path to corporate social responsibility? If the key word
76. Of course, other GUFs are also active in negotiating IFAs.
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is "path" and it is understood that current IFAs represent just the beginning,
the answer is yes.
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TABLE 1*
COMPANY COUNTRY GUF YEAR
Danone France IUF 1988
Accor France IUF 1995
IKEA Sweden IFBWW 1998
Statoil Norway ICEM 1998
Faber-Castell Germany IFBWW 1999
Freudenberg Germany ICEM 2000
Hochtief Germany IFBWW 2000
Carrefour France UNI 2001
Chiquita USA IUF 2001
OTE Telecome Greece UNI 2001
Skanska Sweden IFBWW 2001
Telefonica Spain UNI 2001
Indesit (Merloni) Italy IMF 2002
Endesa Spain ICEM 2002
Ballast Nedam Netherlands IFBWW 2002
Fonterra New Zealand IUF 2002
Volkswagen Germany IMF 2002
Norske Skog Norway ICEM 2002
AngloGold South Africa ICEM 2002
DaimlerChrysler Germany IMF 2002
Eni Italy ICEM 2002
Leoni Germany IMF 2003
ISS Denmark UNI 2003
GEA Germany IMF 2003
SKF Sweden IMF 2003
Rheinmetall Germany IMF 2003
H&M Sweden UNI 2004
Bosch Germany IMF 2004
Prym Germany IMF 2004
SCA Sweden ICEM 2004
Lukoil Russia ICEM 2004
Renault France IMF 2004
Impregilo Italy IFBWW 2004
Electricit6 de France(EDF) France ICEM/PSI 2005
Rhodia France ICEM 2005
Veidekke Norway IFBWW 2005
BMW Germany IMF 2005
EADS Netherlands IMF 2005
R6chling Germany IMF 2005
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COMPANY COUNTRY GUF YEAR
Schwan-Stabilo Germany IFBWW 2005
Lafarge Group France BWI/ICEM 2005
Arcelor Luxembourg IMF 2005
PSA Peugeot Citroen France IMF 2006
Royal Barn Group Netherlands BWI 2006
Portugal Telecom Portugal UNI 2006
Securitas Sweden UNI 2006
Brunel Netherlands IMF 2007
* This table is from the International Metalworkers' Federation website:
http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?n=47& 1 =2&c
= 10266.
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TABLE 2: IMF AND BWI INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS
IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
Rochling: "[Slupports and ILO standards "[B]asic No monitoring
European Works expressly specifically principles shall No neutral
Council, EMF, encourages its referenced, be made dispute
IMF (2004) business partners available to all resolution
to take into managements, mechanism.
account the interest
agreed-upon representatives
principles in their and employees..
respective . in suitable
company policy." form."
Bosch: Europa "Bosch will not ILO standards Distribution No neutral
Committee of the work with any explicitly through the dispute
Bosch Group, suppliers who referenced. Bosch Group. resolution





Rheinmetall AG: "Rheinmetall AG ILO standards "Principles will No neutral
European Works supports and explicitly be made dispute
Council, EMF, expressly referenced, available in an resolution
IMF (2003) encourages its appropriate form mechanism.
business partners to the No monitoring.
to take into management, the
account and worker's
apply the agreed representatives,
guidelines in and employees of
their own all operations
corporate throughout the
policy." group."
SKF: EMF, IMF "Encourages its ILO standards No provision on No neutral
(2003) suppliers to not referenced, implementation. dispute
adhere to similar resolution
codes of mechanism.
conduct." No monitoring.
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IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
Arcelor: IMF, Arcelor supports ILO Conventions Signatories Monitoring
EMF (2005) and encourages specifically "undertake to referenced.
its contractors referenced, jointly bring this No neutral
and suppliers to agreement to the dispute
take this knowledge of all resolution




BMW: EURO Business partners ILO Conventions Disseminated No neutral
Works Council and "suppliers specifically within the BMW dispute
of the BMW will be referenced. Group in an resolution
Group, IMF encouraged to "appropriate mechanism.















IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
Renault: IMF, The company ILO Conventions IFA will be No neutral
Renault Group "informs its own specifically distributed to all dispute
Works Council, suppliers of the referenced. the personnel of resolution
FGTB, CFDT, contents of this Renault Group mechanism.
CFTC, CGT, Declaration and companies. No monitoring.
CC.OO, CSC, the Global
FO, UGT, Compact and
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IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
Prym: European "Prym supports ILO Conventions "Employees of "The group
Works Council, and encourages specifically Prym are management
IMF (2004) their business referenced. informed about annually informs
partners, to all terms of this the EWC in its
consider this declaration in meeting on the
declaration in their reali[s]ation and
their own corresponding will discuss
respective national together with the























































that it is adhered



















Lafarge and "Lafarge will ILO Standards "Will provide No neutral
IFBWW, ICEM seek to use the explicitly information dispute
and WFBW services of those referenced. concerning this resolution
(2005) trading partners, agreement in mechanism
subcontractors written or verbal explicitly
and suppliers, form in all referenced.
which recognize countries where No monitoring
and implement this agreement is explicitly
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IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
Hochtief: BWI, "Hochtief ILO standards "Employees of No neutral
IG BAU, Works requires that its are referenced, Hochtief will be dispute
Council (2002) contractual but not informed orally resolution
partners shall specifically or in writing of mechanism is
support this Code enumerated, all the referenced.
of Conduct and stipulations of No Monitoring.
shall also ensure this Code of
that it is adhered Conduct."
to by any of their
contractual
partners who are
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IFA Coverage Content Implementation Enforcement
IKEA and "Suppliers must ILO standards "[S]upplier shall Monitoring
IFBWW (1998) comply with referenced, effectively group formed.
national laws and communicate to No neutral
regulation and all its sub- resolution
with international suppliers, as well mechanism








Viedekke: "[W]ill use its ILO standards "[A]vailable at Monitoring
Fellesforbundet, fullest influence specifically all workplaces . referenced.
Norsk in order to secure referenced. .also made No neutral
Arbeidsmandsfor compliance with "The employer public on... resolution
bund, IFBWW the principles set shall take a website." mechanism.
(2005) out in this positive attitude





Skanska and "[A]pply to all "Employment "[A]greement... Monitoring
IFBWW (2001) units and conditions.., announced at committee
subsidiaries shall meet the company referenced.
minimum worksites in the Neutral dispute
requirements of respective resolution
national languages..." mechanism
legislation (arbitration)
relevant to ILO referenced.
conventions and
recommendation
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IFA I Coverage [ Content [Implementation Enforcement
"Brunel agrees to
promote
compliance with
human rights in
all countries in
which the
corporation is
present,
including in
geographical
areas where
human rights are
not yet
sufficiently
protected."
"Brunel agrees to
widely inform
corporation
employees about
the content of
this agreement."
No neutral
dispute
resolution
mechanism
referenced.
No monitoring
referenced.
Brunel and IMF
(2007)
ILO conventions
specifically
referenced.
"Brunel has a
positive attitude
to trade union
membership and
will facilitate
union access for
the purpose of
organising trade
union
membership."
I
